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Court found that Georgia's congressional districting scheme, with a maxi-
mum deviation from the ideal of 108.9 per cent, was unconstitutional.
In Kirkpatrick II, the Court now holds that even a three per cent maximum
deviation from the districting norm fails to satisfy the "as nearly as practi-
cable" limitation. While the districting statute invalidated in Wesberry
grossly discriminated against voters in the larger congressional districts,
the same cannot be said of the Missouri districting scheme. Where the
greatest disparity among districts produces a situation in which one citizen
casts a vote that was 97 per cent of the vote of a citizen in another district,
it is doubtful whether such a differential can amount to a constitutional in-
jury except in a purely abstract sense.
It would seem, therefore, that the Court rejects the Missouri plan be-
cause the state legislature considered factors other than population in dis-
charging the command of article 1, § 2 of the Constitution. Thus, what is
really involved in Kirkpatrick II is not a discriminatory denial of the right
to vote, but rather a violation of the judicially created right to a system
that recognizes numbers as the only basis for representation. Conse-
quently, constitutional rectitude in congressional districting must be
achieved in the following manner:
Straight indeed is the path of the righteous legislator. Slide rule in hand, he must
avoid all thought of county lines, local traditions, politics, history, and economics,
so as to achieve the magic formula: one man, one vote.10 9
This "Draconian pronouncement" can lead to only one result: "abject
surrender of jurisdiction to the mindless computer."'110
Stephen L. Schar
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-
RELAXATION OF REQUIREMENTS?
During the 89th Congress, a special House subcommittee organized to
investigate the expenditures of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, and in particular, those of its chairman, Adam Clayton Powell,
released a report charging Powell and members of his staff with decep-
tions as to certain travel expenditures and with making illegal salary pay-
ments to Powell's wife.' Formal action was postponed until the convening
of the 90th Congress; Powell was then asked to step aside when the oath
109. Supra note 67, at 550 (Harlan J., dissenting).
110. Wells I, supra note 37, at 989.
1. H.R. Rep. No. 2349, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1966).
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of office was administered to the other Representatives-elect. House
Resolution 1 was subsequently adopted, which provided that a committee
be organized to investigate Powell's eligibility to be seated.2  The com-
mittee report found that Powell met the qualifications of age, residency,
and citizenship enumerated in article I, § 2 of the Constitution.3 The re-
port, however, went on to charge Powell with wrongful diversion of House
funds for personal use, unwarranted assertion of privilege and immunity
from process of the courts of New York, and with falsification of expen-
diture reports to the Committee on House Administration. 4 The report re-
commended that Powell be admitted to membership of the 90th Congress,
but that he be censured, fined, and stripped of his seniority.5 A motion to
bring the committee recommendation to a vote was defeated 222 to 202.6
After passing an amendment to the committee resolution which called for
Powell's exclusion,7 the Speaker ruled that the resolution, as amended, re-
quired only a majority vote for passage.8 The House then adopted House
Resolution 278 by a vote of 307 to 116,1 thereby excluding Powell
from the 90th Congress and declaring his seat vacant.
Powell and thirteen voters of the 18th Congressional District of New
York filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, naming as defendants five members of the House of Representa-
tives."' The complaint alleged that House Resolution 278 violated the
Constitution-specifically, that article I, § 2 sets out the exclusive
qualifications (age, residency, and citizenship) for membership in the
House and therefore does not provide that the Representatives are free to
2. 113 Cong. Rec. 14 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1967).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1967) The report was issued
February 23, 1967. Article I, § 2 provides: "No Person shall be a Representa-
tive who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five Years and have been
seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be
an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."
4. Id. at 31-32.
5. Id. at 33.
6. H.R. Res. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 Cong. Rec. 5020 (1967). The
motion was defeated on March 1, 1967.
7. Id. at 5037.
8. U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1 provides: "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a majority of
each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn
from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent
Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide."
9. Supra note 6, at 5039.
10. Named in the action both individually and in their official capacities were
the Clerk, the Doorkeeper, and the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House, as well as the
Speaker.
[Vol. XIX
establish additional qualifications. Thus, a member-elect could not be
excluded on grounds other than failure to meet one or more of the enumer-
ated qualifications. The plaintiffs sought coercive relief to restrain the
Speaker and the ministerial House officials from denying Powell his seat in
the House and prayed for a mandamus directing the defendants to seat
him and restore his lost salary. The petitioners also requested that a
declaratory judgment issue proclaiming Powell's exclusion unconstitutional.
The District Court dismissed the suit "for want of jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter."" The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ac-
knowledged jurisdiction, but affirmed on the grounds that the questions
presented were non-justiciable. 12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
While the case was pending, Powell was reelected to the 91st Congress and
seated (the 90th Congress having terminated), thereby raising the possi-
bility that the controversy had been rendered moot. However, in a 7 to 1
decision, Chief Justice Warren writing for the majority, the Supreme Court
found that Powell's claim for back salary prevented the case from being
moot. The case was remanded, in part, to determine the salary issue.
The Court also concluded that "Petitioner Powell is entitled to a declara-
tory judgment that he was unlawfully excluded from the 90th Congress."
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969).
The issue of legislative exclusion for a failure to meet extra-constitu-
tional qualifications was treated by the Supreme Court as one of first
impression. Although House precedent would seem to indicate such ex-
clusion could be effectuated, 13 its value is diminished by an absence of
uniform House action, and one must ultimately look to sources reflecting
the legislative intent in reaching the conclusion that article I, §. 2 sets
forth the exclusive qualifications for membership in the House. Aside
from the literal interpretation of article I, § 2 requirements for House
membership, Powell v. McCormack also indicates a relaxation of the cri-
teria for issuance of a declaratory judgment. By implying that a declara-
tory judgment may be used to settle an otherwise moot question,' 4 the
Court adds a new dimension to that form of relief. In view of the doubt
as to whether Powell's declaratory judgment can be practically imple-
mented, serious questions are raised as to the propriety of issuing such a
declaration. The purpose of this note is therefore twofold: to trace the
Court's rationale in finding that a Representative-elect may not be excluded
on grounds other than failure to meet the age, residency, and citizenship
11. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1967).
12. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
13. See footnote 20 infra.
14. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1969).
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qualifications of article I, § 2, and to demonstrate the relaxation of re-
quirements heretofore necessary to obtain issuance of a declaratory judg-
ment.
The adoption of House Resolution 278 excluding Adam Clayton Powell
from the 90th Congress for failing to meet qualifications other than those
enumerated in article I, § 2 of the Constitution created a serious problem
of Constitutional interpretation. If the enumerated qualifications (age,
residency, and citizenship) are exclusive, to which the House may neither
add nor substract, Powell's exclusion was necessarily unlawful. Although
article I, § 5, cl. 2 authorizes the House to expel a member for any
reason whatsoever, providing a two-thirds majority concurs'l-and Powell
was in fact excluded by more than a two-thirds majority-the exclusion
was by no means tantamount to expulsion. The Speaker had ruled that
proposed House Resolution 278 in its amended form provided for ex-
clusion, 16 and at the time the vote was taken members of the House were
faced with the dilemma of either casting a vote for exclusion or of going
on record as being opposed to the only punishment proposal that was
likely to come before them.' 7 It is questionable whether, if faced with a
resolution expressly calling for expulsion, the members would have
adopted it.18
The question remains, however, whether in excluding a Representative-
elect, a House exercising that constitutional power is limited to judging
the three qualifications enumerated in article I, § 2 .a9 Article I, § 5,
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 provides: "Each House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."
16. Supra note 6, at 5020.
17. Eckhardt, The Adam Clayton Powell Case, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1205, 1209
(1967).
18. Id. See also Comment, Exclusion of a Member-Elect by a House of Con-
gress, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 716, 717-18 (1967).
19. To term the qualifications of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 "exclusive" is perhaps
misleading. At least four other disqualifications may be found at other points in
the Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3 provides that no one convicted in an
impeachment proceeding shall subsequently "hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
Trust, or Profit under the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 prohibits a
person from being a member of either House while "holding any Office under the
United States ...... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 requires Senators and Representatives
to be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, and it was held in
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132 (1966), that such oath or affirmation may be
required as a condition precedent to holding office. The fourteenth amendment
provides at § 3: "No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
. . . who, having previously taken an oath . . . to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability."
[Vol. XlX
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cl. 1 provides that "Each House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifica-
tions of its own Members, and a majority of each shall constitute a Quorum
to do Business." The question is raised as to whether "Qualifications" in-
cludes something other than age, residency, and citizenship. The history
of the House of Representatives is rich with both successful and unsuccess-
ful attempts at legislative exclusion for failure to meet other than con-
stitutionally enumerated qualifications,2 0 and the discussions of the issues
during such proceedings reflect a diversity of opinion as to the constitu-
tionality of such action.21 Apparently none of the exclusions were ju-
dicially contested, however, resulting in an absence of judicial precedent.
The Supreme Court treated the issue of legislative exclusion for extra-
constitutional qualifications as one of first impression,22 and, due to the
inconsistency of House precedent, grounded its opinion that article I, § 2
sets forth exclusive qualifications on reflections of the draftsmen's intent.2
Of much importance is the dialogue between members of the Constitu-
tional Convention pertaining to the qualifications provision. The three
qualifications of article I, § 2 were unanimously adopted on August 8,
1787.24 On August 10, the Committee of Detail proposed that Congress
should have power to impose uniform property qualifications upon its
members, 25 to which James Madison strongly objected, warning that such
authority would be
an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors
and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed
by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by
degrees subvert the Constitution. 26
The proposal was subsequently defeated, thereby leaving article I, § 2
an unqualified provision.
20. 1 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, §§ 414-17, 448-
52, 464-84 (1907). Precedent seems to establish that a state may not impose
qualifications supplementary to those established by the Constitution (§§ 414-17),
but that a member-elect may be excluded where his national loyalty is not directed
toward the United States (§§ 448-52). Precedent is contradictory regarding ex-
clusion for criminal activity. In 1870, B. F. Whittemore was excluded for com-
mission of bribery (§ 464). In 1870, the House declined to exclude John C. Connor
whose moral character had been impeached (§ 465). George Q. Cannon of Utah
was excluded in 1882 for the practice of polygamy (§ 473), as was Brigham H.
Roberts in 1900 (§§ 477-80).
21. Id.
22. Supra note 14, at 546-47.
23. Supra note 14, at 532-41; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
175 (1926); Note, The Power of a House of Congress to Judge the Qualifications
of its Members, 81 HARv. L. REV. 673, 679 (1968).
24. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 213 (1937).
25. Id. at 179.
26. Id. at 249-50.
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The Colonial debates that considered adoption of the Constitution also
offer some insight into the intent of its authors. Appearing before the
ratifying convention of Virginia, Wilson Carey Nicholas (future Senator
and House member) spoke on the subject of qualifications. Stressing
the importance of having a wide strata of society from which to choose a
legislature, Mr. Nicholas assured the convention that:
[Tihis Constitution has amply attended to this idea. We find no qualifications
required except those of age and residence, which create a certainty of their judg-
ment being matured, and of being attached to their state.27
The Federalist was a series of essays written by Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay between October, 1787 and August, 1788,
which Thomas Jefferson considered
an authority to which appeal is habitually made by all, and rarely declined or denied
by any as evidence of the general opinion of those who framed and of those who
accepted the Constitution of the United States, on questions as to its genuine
meaning,28
offers additional ammunition to those who believe the House may not im-
pose qualifications additional to those of article I, § 2. Hamilton stated:
The qualifications of the elected . . . have been very properly considered and regu-
lated by the convention. A representative of the United States, must be of the age
of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must,
at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the state he is to represent, and during
the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Subject to
these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is
open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or
old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession or
religious faith. 29
In No. 60, Hamilton reiterated:
Its [the legislature's] authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of
the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the per-
sons who may choose or be chosen, . . . are defined and fixed in the constitution;
and are unalterable by the legislature. 80
Aside from these indications of the draftsmen's intent, logic also dic-
tates that the House may not impose additional qualifications to exclude a
Representative-elect. Assume arguendo that the House may impose addi-
tional qualifications upon a member-elect and exclude him by a majority
vote pursuant to article I, § 5, cl. 1. Since article I, § 5, cl. 2 pro-
vides for expulsion of a member for any reason whatsoever as long as
the requisite two-thirds majority concurs, the expulsion power with its
two-thirds safeguard requirement could be circumvented simply by with-
27. 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 8 (Elliot ed. 1937).
28. THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 8 (Padover ed. 1943).
29. THE FEDERALIST, No. LII at 269 (Beloff ed. 1948).
30. Id., No. LX at 311.
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holding a member-elect's seat under the pretense of determining extra-
constitutional qualifications . 1 The framers realized the dangers of allow-
ing the membership of either house of Congress a hand in determining its
own composition; 32 the power of election was to be kept in the hands of the
constituency-hence, the difficult two-thirds vote required for expulsion.
Since Powell was reelected to the 91st Congress while Powell v. Mc-
Cormack was pending adjudication before the Supreme Court, respond-
ents suggested that the case had been rendered moot,33 citing Alejandrino
v. Quezon34 as authority. The facts in Alejandrino were essentially the
same as in Powell. Jose Alejandrino hadbeen appointed to the Philippine
Senate by the Governor General, but was excluded pursuant to a Senate
resolution because of an assault upon another Senator. Alejandrino
brought an action against twenty-two elected members of the Senate, its
President, Secretary, Sergeant-at-Arms, and Paymaster praying for an in-
junction restraining enforcement of the resolution, and for a writ of
mandamus ordering the defendants to recognize the plaintiff as a Senator
and grant him all rights, privileges, and emoluments of office. Before the
case came to the United States Supreme Court, Alejandrino was reap-
pointed to the Senate and seated as a member in good standing.
In dismissing the action as moot because of the reappointment, the
Supreme Court considered the possibility that Alejandrino's claim for lost
wages might save the case. However, the Court decided that the salary
claim was a "mere incident" of the main issue 35 and was not pleaded
with sufficient detail to enable the Court to consider it-namely, that the
petitioner's brief did not address itself to emoluments other than by name,
did not definitely describe the specific officer whose duty it was to pay the
salary, nor did it direct the Court to any statute or Senate rule whereby
the method and manner of salary payment could be ascertained.30 The
Court did recognize, however, that there existed some board whose minis-
terial duty was to pay Senators' salaries, and indicated that Alejandrino
could secure relief through a clearly worded complaint naming such
ministerial officials as defendants and praying for a mandamus to compel
such officials to discharge their ministerial duty, in which case the pres-
31. Eckhardt, supra note 17, at 1208; 2 FARRAND, supra note 24, at 254.
32. 2 FARRAND, supra note 24, at 250.
33. The principle that the Supreme Court will not decide a moot case is a func-
tion of the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the United States
Constitution. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
34. 271 U.S. 528 (1926).
35. Id. at 533.
36. Id.
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ence of Senate members as parties defendant would be unnecessary.3 7
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority in Powell, distinguished
Powell from Alejandrino on procedural grounds. Pointing out that it
was not the incidental character of Alejandrino's salary claim that re-
quired the entire case to be judged moot, but rather that it was "his failure
to plead sufficient facts to establish his mandamus request." s38  Warren
stressed that Powell's complaint named the Sergeant-at-Arms as the indi-
vidual responsible for payment of Powell's salary and prayed for both an
injunction and a mandamus ordering such official to perform his minis-
terial duty. 9 It would seem, though, that even this falls short of the de-
tailed allegations of legislative payroll procedure that Alejandrino indi-
cated would be necessary. 40 The Court did avoid further confrontation
with the salary issue by remanding it:
Since the court below disposed of this case on grounds of justiciability, it did not
pass upon whether Powell had brought an appropriate action to recover his salary.
Where a court of appeals has misconceived the applicable law and therefore failed
to pass upon a question, our general practice has been to remand the case to that
court for consideration of the remaining issues. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Conti-
nental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 704 (1967); Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34 (1956). We believe that such action is
appropriate for resolution of whether Powell in this litigation is entitled to manda-
mus against the Sergeant-at-Arms for salary withheld pursuant to the House resolu-
tion.41
In proceeding beyond the issues concerning injunctive relief, the Court
focused on Powell's claim for declaratory relief and further distinguished
Powell from Alejandrino:
Petitioner Powell has not been paid his salary by virtue of an allegedly unconstitu-
tional House resolution. That claim is still unresolved and hotly contested by
clearly adverse parties. Declaratory relief has been requested, a form of relief not
available when Aleiandrino was decided. A court may grant declaratory relief even
though it chooses not to issue an injunction or mandamus. See United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, . . .; cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 25-26
(1947).42
The Court concluded that Powell's prayer for a declaratory judgment thus
saved the case from mootness, notwithstanding insufficient averments for
37. Id. at 534-35.
38. Supra note 14, at 498.
39. Supra note 14, at 498 n.l1: "Paragraph 18b of petitioners' complaint avers
that 'Leake W. Johnson, as Sergeant-at-Arms of the House' is responsible for
and refuses to pay Powell's salary and prays for an injunction restraining the
Sergeant-at-Arms from implementing the House resolution depriving Powell of his
salary as well as mandamus to order that the salary be paid."
40. Supra note 34, at 533.
41. Supra note 14, at 500-01 n.16.
42. Supra note 14, at 498-99 (emphasis added).
[Vol. XIX
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coercive relief. Is Powell, however, a proper case for declaratory relief?
An investigation of the history and nature of declaratory relief is necessary
to answer this question.
The federal judiciary received authority to issue declaratory judgments
with the adoption of the Declaratory Judgment Act of June 14, 1934:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Fed-
eral taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declara-
tion shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree, and shall be re-
viewable as such. 43
The Act was declared constitutional in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority (1936) as not changing the essential "case or controversy"
requirement of a civil action. 4 4
The Declaratory Judgment Act did not enlarge the jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary, but merely created an additional remedy that had long
existed on the state level. 45  The action is neither legal nor equitable,
but sui generis.46 It differs from an equitable remedy in that the absence
of an adequate legal remedy is not required and the technicalities of equity
procedure do not control. 47  It may be sought as sole relief or in con-
junction with other relief, legal or equitable. 4 8 The purpose of a declara-
tory judgment is to "settle and to afford relief from insecurity with respect
to rights, status, and other legal relations, '49 and to provide prompt and
efficient adjudication of legal rights before a breach has been committed.50
Judicial interpretation of the Act began in 1937 with the case of Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,51 wherein an insurance company sought a
declaration as to whether the defendant insured had suffered a disabling
injury prior to stopping payment of premiums. If the answer was in the
affirmative, the defendant's policy was still in effect and plaintiff would
be required to maintain reserves in excess of $20,000 against possible
claims. If in the negative, defendant's policy would have lapsed for non-
payment of premiums, and the reserves would not have to be maintained.
43. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (1959).
44. 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936).
45. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1937).
46. Id. at 324; see also Sen. Rep. No. 1005, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1950).
47. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933);
Buromin v. National Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214, 216 (D. Del. 1947).
48. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (1959).
49. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
50. 1 C.J.S. Actions § 18(3) (1936).
51. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
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Directing itself to the "case or controversy" requirement, the Court ex-
plored the Act in this light. Since the Act was procedural in nature, cer-
tain substantive elements had to be present as in any other case. The
declaratory judgment could not be used as a tool to circumvent the dis-
abilities of mootness, nonjusticiability, or hypothetical disputes. 52  The
Court held that a controversy did exist since determination of the facts
would determine whether the plaintiff need maintain $20,000 in reserves,
thus terminating the controversy without plaintiff committing a possible
breach of the defendant's rights, and without the necessity of the plaintiff
having to wait until the defendant chose to file a claim.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the declaratory judgment is
that its issuance is discretionary with the court,'," and although there are
fairly clear guidelines, there are no concrete rules a court must follow in
exercising discretion. Edwin Borchard, co-draftsman of the Uniform De-
claratory Judgments Act and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
stated the two principal criteria in favor of rendering a declaration:
(1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal
relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncer-
tainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.64
From this a general postulate is derived, namely, that where the controversy
would not be terminated, or where notwithstanding a declaration, further
proceedings would still be necessary for the plaintiff to obtain relief,
a declaration should be denied. 55
The term "settle the controversy" must be further delineated and de-
fined if it is to be used as a gauge for the exercise of discretion. It is not
necessary that the declaratory judgment settle all the "manifold and mul-
tifarious issues and legal relationships and interrelationships of the en-
tire dispute, [but the controversy in question must be] an autonomous
and independent dispute, involving issues of vital importance."5 6  There-
fore, declaratory relief has been denied where there was doubt as to
52. Id. at 240; see also 6A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 57.14 at 3078 (2d ed.
1964); BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 29-36, (1st ed. 1934).
53. Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); Ara-
lac, Inc. v. Hat Corp. of America, 166 F.2d 286 (3rd Cir. 1948); Borchard, Dis-
cretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions for Declaratory Judgments, 26 MINN. L.
REV. 677 (1942); Vannaman and Kutner, Declaratory Judgments in the Federal
Courts, 90 OHIo ST. L. J. 209 (1948); 6A MOORE, supra 52, § 57.41.
54. BORCHARD, supra note 52, at 107.
55. Cha-Toine Hotel Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Shogren, 204 F.2d 256, 258
(7th Cir. 1953); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service Inc., 101
F.2d 514, 515 (3rd Cir. 1938); supra note 45, at 325; Public Service Comm'n of
Utah v. Wycoff Co., supra note 53; 6A MOORE, supra note 52, § 57.08 at 3025.
56. 6A MOORE, supra note 52, § 57.08(4) at 3033.
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whether proper adversary parties were present,5 7 where a more appro-
priate or more effective remedy existed, 58 where initial determination of the
issues had been committed to an administrative body,59 and where stat-
utory remedies had not been exhausted.60
Cha-Toine Hotel Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Shogren6 a illustrates the
above observations well. The plaintiff was an Illinois corporation which
filed suit for a declaratory judgment seeking a determination that housing
owned by it was a hotel and not subject to rent control under the Housing
and Rent Act of 1947. Named as defendant was Norman B. Shogren,
the chief administrative officer in Chicago, Illinois. In declining to issue
the declaratory judgment, the court held that the Director of Rent
Stabilization was a necessary party to the action, since he was responsible
for national administration of the Act, and the named administrator was
merely a subordinate official.
A declaratory judgment is appropriate only when it will terminate the controversy
giving rise to the proceeding. . . . In the instant case, it is not discernible how a
judgment could have sufficient finality to terminate the controversy, in the absence
of the Director as a party.62
The court also noted that the Act provided for initial inspection of housing
by the Director to determine its status under the Act. The fact that such
administrative procedure had not been exhausted also mitigated against
issuing the declaration: "It is not for the courts to bypass such adminis-
trative procedures by making the initial determination of fact in a suit
for a declaratory judgment . . .63
Discretion to enter a declaratory judgment differs from other forms of
judicial discretion with regard to appellate review. "Discretion" may be
defined as
the power exercised by courts to determine questions to which no strict rule of law
is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circumstances of the case, are
controlled by the personal judgment of the court.6 4
In this sense, disretionary judicial action is final and may not be upset on
appeal unless it is shown that such discretion has been abused, that the
57. Channel Master Corp. v. JFD Electronics Corp., 263 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. N.Y.
1965).
58. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. Bulk Carriers Ltd., 249 F. Supp. 743,
746 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
59. Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., supra note 53.
60. Emmons v. Smitt, 58 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1944).
61. Cha-Toine Hotel Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Shogren, supra note 55.
62. Cha-Toine Hotel Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Shogren, supra note 55, at
258.
63. Cha-Toine Hotel Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Shogren, supra note 55.
64. Bouv. Law Dict. 305 (Baldwin ed. 1934).
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"judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, . . . [or] where no
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court."6 5 When
reviewing a declaratory judgment decision, however, the appellate court
may substitute its discretion for that of the trial court and reverse the
lower court if it feels the decision erroneous, although not arbitrary.
6
The subject of discretion was thoroughly discussed in Delno v. Market
St. Ry. Co., ;7 where the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that five
$1,000 first mortgage bonds of defendant railway held by him were su-
perior to the lien of owners of other bonds who had agreed to extend
their maturity in contravention of the mortgage agreement. After assert-
ing that the appellate court could substitute its discretion for that of the
district court, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's granting of
the declaration. Noting that the other bondholders were not parties de-
fendant and that any judgment rendered would not bind them, the court
addressed itself to the issue of controversy settlement:
While such a judgment might terminate the issue between the parties now before
it, it would not finally settle the issue because the absent bondholders would have the
right to litigate the same question. 68
While the lower court felt that an autonomous and independent aspect of
the dispute would be settled by a declaratory judgment, the appellate
court, though not willing to say the lower court abused its discretion, never-
theless thought that the Declaratory Judgment Act envisioned settlement of
the entire controversy, and thus substituted its discretion for that of the
lower court.
Bearing in mind the criteria for exercise of discretion in a declaratory
judgment action, the propriety of declaratory relief in Powell is dubious
when one considers the extent to which the dispute was settled-or left
unsettled. A blanket declaration that Congressional action was uncon-
stitutional is of questionable legitimacy. That issue was decidedly moot
but for Powell's claim to back salary, and it is far from certain that
Powell can recoup his loss. If such claim be important enough to prod
the Court into serious constitutional interpretation, it would seem that the
Court would offer some definite guidelines for the molding of relief,
especially since Powell v. McCormack was found to present a justiciable
controversy6" and effective molding of relief is one aspect of justiciability. 70
65. Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
66. Id. at 968; accord, Vanneman and Kutner, supra note 53, at 223; 6A MOORE,
supra note 52, § 57.08(2) at 3030; contra, National Labor Relations Board v.
Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1944).
67. Supra note 65.
68. Supra note 65, at 968-69.
69. Supra note 14, at 550.
70. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
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The problems awaiting Powell should he attempt to utilize his declara-
tory judgment for recovery of his salary are numerous. There are three re-
maining defendants, only one of whom, the Sergeant-at-Arms, controls
salary disbursements. It is uncertain whether a writ of mandamus directing
him to pay Powell could be obeyed, since he is permitted by law only to
release funds when presented with certificates signed by the Clerk 7' and
the Speaker,72 and the Speaker is no longer a party to the action. Further-
more, the office of Sergeant-at-Arms of the 90th Congress has expired, and
the present Sergeant-at-Arms serves the 91st Congress. 73 All funds not
used for the 90th Congress were presumably returned to the United States
Treasury pursuant to custom,7 4 so it is doubtful that the Sergeant-at-
Arms of the 90th Congress has funds available or would be authorized to
disburse salaries due a member of a previous session, whether directed to
by mandamus or not. Such abundant uncertainty of final outcome is
hardly the controversy settlement envisioned by the Declaratory Judgment
Act. And since there is doubt as to whether all proper adversary parties
are affected by the declaration so as to provide the foundation for re-
covery of Powell's back salary, a declaratory judgment could also have
been properly refused for this reason.
75
A declaratory judgment should be refused where a more effective or
useful remedy is available. Since the Court held Powell's claim to salary
the only viable issue of Powell's suit, a more appropriate remedy would
have been an action in the Court of Claims for a money judgment against
the United States. 76 That court would have had no authority to declare
the action of the House of Representatives unconstitutional, 77 but the
difficulties associated with coercive remedies against members and em-
ployees of the House would have been avoided, and it would not have
been necessary to decide all the constitutional issues analyzed in Powell.
Such a course would have more closely conformed to the Court's prin-
ciple not "to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re-
quired by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
78
Glenn Pasvogel
71. 2 U.S.C. § 34 (1965).
72. 2 U.S.C. § 48 (1965).
73. Supra note 14, at 570 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
74. Supra note 14, at 571 n.21 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
75. See supra note 57.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1965).
77. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
78. Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885).
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